APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES AND THE
NEED FOR A REVIEWABLE RECORD
If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is
firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control
over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by statute-'
Adherence to the rule against sentence review has occasionally resulted in clearly excessive but unchallengeable sentences 2 and in unjusti-

fied disparity in punishment for similar crimes.'
Not surprisingly,
though the rule is still widely followed, 4 it has been subjected to re-

lentless criticism.5 In response to such criticism and to frequent in1. Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930). There is statutory authority for sentence review of various kinds in fifteen states. See AL-As. STAT.
ANN. § 12.55.120 (1973); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-2501 et seq. (1969); and
statutes reviewed in ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCE App. A (Approved Draft, 1968). The
courts of at least six other states have interpreted their general appellate mandates to
include such authority. See id. at 14-15.
2. One of many examples is the case of a fifty-one-year-old first offender who
was given a fifty-two year sentence for one narcotics sale, despite the lack of any aggravating circumstances. Although the appeals court felt that the sentence was "greater
than should have been imposed," it pronounced itself powerless to review the sentence.
Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467 (10th Cir. 1959). For other examples of
excessive sentences, see ABA PROJECT, supra note 1, at 22; Kennedy, Justice Is Found
in the Hearts and Minds of Free Men, 30 F.R.D. 401, 424-25 (1961).
3. For example, two similar cases of check forgery were punished, respectively,
by a thirty-day and a fifteen-year sentence. "Our examination of these two cases indicated no significant differences for sentencing purposes."

M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL.

SENTENCES 21-22 (1973), quoting James V. Bennett, former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons.
In 1958, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported: "During 1957 average sentences
to imprisonment for all types of crimes varied from 8.9 months in New Hampshire to
54.6 months in western Oklahoma. . . . Even the proportion of convicted offenders
placed on probation for all types of crimes varies widely, ranging from 15.3 percent in
western Texas to 68.8 percent in Vermont." S. REP. No. 2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1958). For a general survey of sentence disparity, see Zumwalt, The Anarchy of
Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 96 (1973) (compiled from U.S.
Bureau of Prisons, Statistical Table Number 7 (1968) ).
4. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 454 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Lloyd, 431 F.2d 160
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971). See cases cited note 19 infra.
5. See, e.g., Burr, Appellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing Discretion-A Workable Alternative, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1971); Cobwin, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of Sentencing, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 207
(1971); Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 521
(1937); Sobeloff, The Sentence of the Court: Should There Be Appellate Review? 41
A.B.Al. 13 (1955).
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stances of unfairness, federal appeals courts have increasingly avoided
the rule against sentence review. Given the apparent breadth of these
judicially developed avoidance techniques, it can probably be said that
an appeals court now has ample precedent for the review of any sentence
it considers outrageous.
Despite the initial encouragement that these developments might
afford him, a convicted defendant seeking sentence review still faces
two major problems. First, the defendant's access to review is a function of 'the extent to which the circuit in which he was tried has adopted
one or more of these techniques for avoiding the rule of nonreview,
and there is great variation in this respect among circuits. Second,
access to serious review is dependent upon the existence of a reviewable
record. At present, a sentencing judge is usually not required to disclose to the defendant or to an appeals court either the presentence
report or the judge's grounds for a particular sentence. 0 This freedom
to operate in secret, if at all justifiable, accords only with a system
where sentencing decisions are not reviewable. If sentences may be
subjected to appellate scrutiny, the compilation of a reviewable record
of the sentencing decision would appear to be mandated. This Note
will trace the origin and the history of the judge-made rule against
sentence review. The various means of avoiding the rule will then
he discussed, leading to the conclusion that in some jurisdictions
the rule has been completely undermined. Finally, it will be argued
that the increasing availability of review necessitates a change from
secrecy to openness in the sentencing process.
HISTORY OF THE RULE AGAINST REVIEW OF SENTENCES

Origin of the Rule
The federal rule against appellate review of sentences
was first
propounded in 1917 in the landmark case of Freeman v. United
States.7 The Ninth Circuit initially decided that there had been no
error in the trial court's conviction and sentencing of Freeman. In
dictum, the court then announced that even if a sentencing error were
found, the appeals court would have no power to review it. That conclusion rested upon the fact that although the old circuit courts had
been given a statutory power "to pronounce final sentence" and had
6. See notes 94-99, 115-25 infra and accompanying text.
7. 243 F. 353 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919). Freeman, who
had used the mails to inform persons that he could cure all ailments if paid certain

sums, was convicted of mail fraud and sentenced to one year's imprisonment.
8. Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20. Stat. 354.
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exercised it,9 such an express grant of power was omitted from the 1891
statute creating the modem courts of appeals.,1 In Freeman, the
Ninth Circuit focused on this omission and accordingly held itself

powerless to review a legal sentence imposed by' the district court."
The court need not have attributed significance to the omission,
for another section of the 1891 Act adopted for the new courts of
appeals the same "methods and system of review" 2 under which the
old circuit courts had operated. Since that system of review mncluded

review of sentences by the old circuit courts, 13 this language in the
1891 Act could have been construed to provide a basis for sentence

review by the new courts of appeals.

Moreover, the Freeman court

did not necessarily have to conclude that the appellate power to review

sentences had been omitted from the 1891 statute, under which
appellate court [could] affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment,
decree, or order brought before it for review, or [could] direct such judgment, decree, or order to be rendered, or such further proceedings to
4
be had by the inferior court as the justice of the case [might] requirei
[tihe

Under the 1891 statute, sentence revision clearly could have been considered a legitimate exercise of the power to "modify" a judgment
order.'r

Nevertheless, the dubious statutory construction in Freeman has
survived; since Freeman, no federal appeals court has expressly

reviewed the severity of a sentence as a normal incident of appellate
9.. See United States v. Wynn, 11 F. 57 (1882);. Bates v. United States, 10 F.
92 (1881).
10. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 St at. 826.
11. 243 F. at 357.
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 11, 26 Stat. 829, provided:
All provisions of law now in force regulating the methods and system of review ... shall regulate the methods and system of appeals . .-.provided for
in this act in respect of the circuit courts of appeals.
"Methods and systems" was later interpreted by the Supreme Court to comprehend the
power of the federal courts of appeals. See Ballew v. United States, 160 U.S. 187,
201-02 (1895).
13. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
14. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 2, 17 Stat. 197 (made effective with respect to
courts of appeals by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 11, 26 Stat. 829). As to the
effect of the 1891 Act, the House Judiciary Committee reported: "It destroys the 'judicial despotism' of the present system by creating an intermediate appellate court, with
power to revise the final judgments of the district courts in all cases, civil and criminal,
except . .. where the fine is not over $300 and does not involve imprisonment."
H.R. R P. No. 1295, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1890).
15. Several state courts have made such an interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Ledbetter, 83 Idaho 451, 364 P.2d 171 (1961); Blake v. State, 186 Ark. 77, 52 S.W.2d 644
(1932).
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Though judges have occasionally questioned the Freeman

interpretation,17 the general judicial attitude was best expressed by
Judge Frank in his review of the sentences imposed on Julius and

Ethel Rosenberg, who were later executed for leaking atomic secrets
to the Russians.

"[Because of] undeviating federal precedents," the

judge wrote, "it is clear that the Supreme Court alone is in a position
to hold that [the relevant federal statute] confers authority to reduce
a sentence which is not outside the bounds set by a valid statute."' 8
The Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly ruled on the

existence of an inherent appellate power to review sentences directly,
except to hold that the district judge's discretion is very broad:
[I]t is true that the imposition of the . .. penalty . . seems unduly
severe; but there may have been other facts and circumstances before
the trial court properly influencing the extent of the punishment. In
any event, the matter was one for that court .... 19

Given the lack of a statutory or Supreme Court mandate to support the rule against sentence review and given the increasing criti-

cism of the rule,20 it is not surprising that appellate judges have often
strained to formulate means of avoiding the rule in order to review
excessive sentences.

Avoidance of the Rule by the Courtsof Appeals
An appeals court could ask two questions about a sentence: one

is whether the sentencing procedure was fair; the other is whether the
judge's discretionary decision to impose a particular sentence was sub-

stantially appropriate.

Since the landmark 1948 Supreme Court case

of Townsend v. Burke,2 it has been commonly said that an appeals

court can ask the first question regarding sentencing procedure but not
16. For the modem grant of federal appellate power, substantially unchanged from
the 1891 version, see 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462, 468 (10th Cir. 1959) (Murrah,
CJ., dissenting); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-07 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305 (1932); cf. United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("a sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if
within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review"). See also Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
It is important to note, however, that the quotation from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Blockburger would, by its own terms, seem not to pertain to a case in which
the reviewing court is fully informed as to the "facts and circumstances" which influenced the severity of the sentence.
20. See authorities cited note 5 supra. In 1968 the American Bar Association approved a report favoring sentence review. See ABA PloJECr, supra note 1, at 7.
21. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
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the second regarding substance. Ostensibly to justify the more limited
procedural review, the federal appellate courts have on a number of oc-

casions advanced three rationales: the obligation to ensure due process in
sentencing, the need to protect a defendant's right to refrain from self-

incrimination, and the desire to enforce correct interpretation of sentencing statutes.2 2

But even though these rationales appear to con-

cern procedure, it is a principal thesis of this Note that these notions
have in effect disguised review of the severity or substance of sentences as well. In addition to this de facto substantive review, some
appellate courts have engaged in direct substantive review of sentence
severity by exercising their supervisory control over the lower federal

courts and, on occasion, even by engaging in explicit review of a trial
court's discretion.
Ensuring due process. The Townsend Court established the
principle that, while the severity of a sentence is generally not subject to
appellate review, the process of sentencing is reviewable. In Town-

send the defendant was not represented by counsel at sentencing, and
the sentencing judge was misinformed as to the defendant's prior crim-

inal record. Holding that this combination of circumstances deprived
the defendant of due process, 23 the Supreme Court vacated the sentence.
Several recent decisions, which have emphasized defects in the

sentencing process, have used the due process rationale to greatly
extend Townsend's inroad into the area of the sentencing judge's

discretion.

Whereas Townsend's sentence was based on false infor-

22. The procedural rationales discussed here are those which appear to have been
stretched to justify substantive review. Often due process and other rationales have
actually been used purely to guarantee procedural review. See note 23 infra.
23. 334 U.S. at 740-41. Flowing readily from Townsend have been numerous sentences disapproved because the sentencing judge considered "improper factors." Unlike
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972), where a discretionary decision of the sentencing judge was considered improper
(see text accompanying notes 25-29 infra), these other cases have found sentencing
procedures defective on due process grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443 (1972) (sentencing judge's reliance on prior convictions, for which defendant
had not been represented by counsel, violated defendant's right to counsel); Kelly v.
United States, No. 73-1240 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1973) (reversed and remanded because sentencing judge did not await confirmation of the challenged validity of prior
convictions of the defendant); United States v. Powell, No. 73-1210 (4th Cir. Nov.
19, 1973) (review of sentence upheld, since the record below, as distinguished from information surfacing in related litigation, failed to support the judge's material belief
that the defendant had operated as a "ringleader" in the crime for which he had been
convicted); United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 984 (1973) (where the sentencing judge apparently penalized the defendant for
having stood trial, the defendant's right to trial was violated); Haller v. Robbins, 409
F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969) (sentencing judge improperly considered prejudicial informa,
tion conveyed ex parte by the prosecutor).
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mation,24 in United States v. Weston25 the sentencing judge was
persuaded by unsubstantiated hearsay as to the great extent of the
defendant's unproven criminality.26 Notwithstanding the appeals
court's recognition of strong authority that a sentencing judge is not
bound by the evidentiary rules which govern a trial,217 the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing, holding broadly that "the 'no
review of sentence' rule does not preclude reviewing the propriety
of the reasons for imposing a particular sentence. '2 8 Although the
Ninth .Circuit carefully distinguished "reviewing a sentence" from
reviewing the procedure or the "propriety of the reasons,"2 9 it significantly chose to-'examine the sentencing procedure in a case where a
first narcotics offender had been given an exceptionally harsh maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment.
In Townsend and Weston, the sentencing judges had expressly
placed an improper emphasis on false or doubtful information.3 0 ,However, in Virgin Islands v. Turndr,31 nothing in the record prompted
"procedural" review; the only evidence before the Third Circuit which
indicated that the sentencing judge had considered such improper
factors was the severity of the sentence:
A ten-year sentence for larceny of merchandise worth under $1000
....seems to us high. . .

[W]e'are led to wonder whether the evi-

dence the government was unable to develop at the trial found itself in
s2
the sentencing proceedings or the judge's mind.
Despite its nominal deference to the rule that the severity of a sentence
is not reviewable, the Third Circuit delicately suggested that the
defendant "move for a reduction of sentence so that the district court
may have an opportunity. to reconsider this matter." 33 Thus, it ap24. 334 U.S. at 7 40.

25. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
26. The presentence report unreliably indicated that Weston, who had been convicted of possession of heroin, was a major narcotics dealer. Id. at 630.
27. E.g., Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489 (1969); Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949).

28. 448 F.2d at 632. But see United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416, 421 (2d
Cir. 1950), where the court held that the sentencing judge's "reason for the length of
the sentence would not affect iis
validity and should be ignored on appeal."
29. 448 F.2d at 631-32.

30. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739-40 (1948); United States v. Weston,
448 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1971).

31. 409 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1968).
32. Id. at 104. The Third Circuit stated that, having charged Turner with making
unauthorized credit card purchases totaling $800, the Government in opening its caso
irresponsibly referred to "more than $4000 in fraudulent charges." Id. at 103.
33. Id. at 104.
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pears that the Townsend rule, if manipulated by a well-intentioned
and moderately artful court of appeals, is no bar to effective review of
the severity of a sentence.
Protecting the defendant's privilege agtiinst self-incrimination. A
review of sentencing "procedure" may also be deemed necessary, to
preserve a defendant's right to refrain from self-incrimination, though
the circuits have varied in the degree to which they have protected a defendant's fifth amendment rights at sentencing. The typical situation
involves a defendant who has pleaded not guilty but who has nevertheless been convicted. The trial judge, at a sentencing hearing, asks
the defendant whether he would like to admit his guilt. Even though
the context makes it clear that the defendant would receive a lighter
sentence for "coming clean," the defendant persists in denying guilt.
4
When confronted by these facts in Thomas v. United States,"
the Fifth Circuit found that procedural error, inter alia, justified a
remand for resentencing. 3 5 Although Thomas' refusal to confess guilt
technically preserved his fifth amendment rights, the harsh sentence
was held to be an improper "judicially imposed penalty for exercising
constitutionally guaranteed rights."3 6
Reviewing similar facts, the Ninth Circuit in Gollaher v. United
States3 found no procedural error. Upon conviction, "the judge must
proceed upon the basis that the defendant is guilty. ' 38 The defendant's prospect for rehabilitation, as arguably indicated by his
willingness to admit fault, was therefore held to be a valid consideration at sentencing."
The defendant Gollaher faced a maximum sentence of twentyseven years of imprisonment; he was sentenced to two. The defendant
34. 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
35. In remanding for resentencing, the court of appeals also relied upon its supervisory power over the district courts. See notes 57-67 infra and accompanying text.
36. 368 F.2d at 946. "Still open to [Thomas] were the processes of motion for
new trial (including the opportunity to discover new evidence), appeal, petition for
certiorari, and collateral attack." Id. at 945. All these remedies would have been
jeopardized if Thomas had confessed; there also would have been the possibility of
prosecution for perjury had he done so. See generally Note, The Influence of the
Defendant's Plea on JudicialDetermination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 220 (1956).
37. 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
38. Id. at 530-31.
39. Cf. Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1958) (after a
plea of guilty, the sentencing judge properly considered a confession which had been
illegally obtained from the defendant); Hanneman v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 689, 184 N.W.2d
896 (1971) (since a guilty plea is a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination,
the sentencing judge properly considered defendant's refusal to testify at a sentencing
hearing).
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Thomas faced a maximum of twenty-five years and was sentenced to
twenty-five. The Gollaher court, finding no procedural error, was
careful to note the length of the sentences imposed in both casesY4
Whether the Ninth Circuit will decide to protect a defendant's fifth

amendment rights in the face of a penalty more severe than that ordered in Gollaher remains to be seen. If it is true that a harsh sentence triggers review of the fifth amendment considerations outlined

above,41 the circuits are engaged in review of the severity of sentences.42
Enforcing sentencing statutes. A final rationale often used only
obtensibly to justify review of sentencing procedure concerns the enforcement of sentencing statutes. An appellate court may thus vacate even
a sentence within the statutory limit on the grounds that the sentence
was based upon a misconception of the sentencing statute. A straight-

forward application of this rationale led to sentence review in United
States v. Lewis,4 3 where the sentencing judge, revoking defendant's pro-

bation but wishing to qualify defendant for early parole, mistakenly
believed he had no choice but to impose the maximum sentence.
Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence. 4

The

Less obvious applications of the appellate power to enforce sentencing statutes were explained by Judge Sobeloff45 in United States
48
v. Wilson:
While a sentence fixed in the exercise of discretion within statutory
limits is unassailable on appeal, the appellate court may scrutinize a
40. 419 F.2d at 529-30.
41. See Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the appeals
court followed Thomas to find procedural error after the defendant had received a
sentence of from five to the maximum fifteen years.
42. See United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.24 (2d Cir. 1952),
citing United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1943) and United States v.
Trypuc, 136 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1943). The Rosenberg court recalled: "This
Court has said that where it considers a sentence unduly harsh, it will be more inclined to regard as harmful an error otherwise probably harmless." 195 F.2d at 604
n.24.
43. 392 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1968).
44. Another pase of reversal where the sentencing judge had misinterpreted the
statute is Coleman v. United States, 357 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1965). There the
judge had improperly placed on the defendant the burden of showing why his death
penalty should be reduced to life imprisonment.
45. Judge Sobeloff has consistently advocated appellate review of sentences: "If it
is desirable to articulate generalized principles for measuring penalties, the appellate
tribunal is precisely where the attempt should be made upon the foundation of the work
of the district courts." Symposium-Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249,
275 (1962).
46. 450 F.2d 495 (1971).
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sentence to ascertain whether there has indeed been an exercise of dis47
cretion.

Thus, since a number of sentencing statutes authorize judges to consider various alternative forms of punishment, 48 the failure of the sentencing judge to exercise the required discretion may result in sentence review. 9
In Wilson the sentencing judge inadvertently failed to consider
sentencing alternatives afforded by the Federal Youth Corrections

Act;10 thus the Fourth Circuit could find statutory authority to review a sentence it avowedly considered excessive.5 1 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed the sentence imposed in United States v. Wiley [1]12 where the sentencing judge had summarily dismissed the

defendant's application for probation in conformance with his policy
of not granting probation to defendants who stood trial.53 According
to the Seventh Circuit, summary dismissal violated a clear statutory requirement that an application for probation "be received and acted
upon by the court . . . .
As in Wilson, the sentencing judge's
failure to exercise discretion as required by statute was held to have
rendered the sentence reviewable.
The Wiley I court, stating that the severity of Wiley's sentence
was "irrelevant," nevertheless pointedly indicated the penalty's unfairness.5 5 In view of the weakness of the court's rationale that its review
47. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
48. For examples of such statutes, see Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences:
To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 STAN. L. RFv. 405, 408 (1968). Judge
Weigel's data indicate that there is great disparity among district judges as to the proper
"exercise of discretion" in deciding, for example, whether to use an indeterminate sentence or to impose a fixed sentence under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5031-37 (1970).
49. See United States v. Hollis, 450 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Williams, 407 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969). In Williams evidence before the sentencing
judge indicated that Williams was an addict; the sentence was vacated because the judge
failed to consider whether the defendant was entitled to treatment under the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3411-26, 3441 (1970).
Hollis
reached the same result, even though there had been no evidence before the sentencing judge to indicate addiction.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970).
51. The Wilson court declared: "The disparity between the crime and the punishment is baffling." 450 F.2d at 498. Wilson's crime was forging a ninety-dollar check.
He was sentenced to imprisonment for three years, despite an otherwise clean record
and a recommendation of probation in the presentence report.
52. 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959). For the history of the Wiley litigation, see
text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
53. Id. at 455.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 456. Wiley's codefendants, more culpable and possessing worse prior
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was mandated by statute,5 6 it seems clear that the court was engaged
in substantive review.

Exercising supervisory control. In several instances, appellate
courts have abandoned the pretense of procedural review and have

initiated a direct inquiry into the appropriateness of a sentence. To effectuate this substantive review, federal appeals courts have the
power to supervise the lower federal courts in the establishment and

maintenance of "civilized standards of procedure and evidence,"'
power not limited to ensuring constitutional due

process.5 8

7

a

For exam-

ple, in Yates v. United States,6 9 the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power to reduce a sentence for contempt

0°

Although there

is no statutory limit for a contempt penalty and the Supreme Court
has therefore felt a special responsibility to ensure fairness in contempt sentences, 61 no logical bar to greater exercise of supervisory
power over sentencing is apparent 2
Several courts have specifically relied upon the supervisory pow-

er to attack sentences which penalized the exercise of constitutional
rights. It will be recalled that in the Thomas case' 8 a harsh sentence

had punished the defendant for his refusal to waive his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Fifth Circuit, imposing its "notions of good policy" on the district court, found sufficient
records, received two-year sentences. Wiley was sentenced to three years, apparently
only because be had stood trial.
56. The statutory language, requiring the judge to "act upon" the application for
probation, could be construed to require only disposition. See id. at 458 (Hastings,
J.,dissenting in part): "The motion [for probation] was received and acted upon unfavorably."
57. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See Thomas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court cites authority that it "is
now well settled that the Courts of Appeals, as well as the Supreme Court, have . . .
supervisory control.

.. ."

58. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947):
Over federal proceedings we may exert a supervisory power with greater freedom to reflect our notions of good policy than we may constitutionally exert
over proceedings in state courts, and these expressions of policy are not necessarily embodied in the concept of due process.
59. 356 U.S. 363 (1958).
60. After reversing ten of defendant's eleven convictions for contempt, the Supreme Court remanded with "gentle intimations" that a reduced sentence was in order.
When the same sentence was reimposed, the Supreme Court stated that "the District
Court appears not to have exercised its discretion" and ordered a reduced sentence.
Id. at 366-67.
61. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958); Yates v. United States,
356 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1957).
62. For a discussion of whether the supervisory power is "ancillary to the appellate
power," see 74 YALE L.J. 379, 384-85 n.35 (1964).
63. For a discussion of Thomas, see text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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authority in its supervisory power to vacate the sentence, even though
the appeals court was unable to find a technical violation of the defendant's fifth amendment rights.6 4
In the Wiley 1 case discussed above, 65 it was clear that the
judge had stiffened the sentence because the defendant stood trial
rather than plead guilty. On remand for resentencing, under instructions from the Seventh Circuit to sentence without regard to
that factor, the district judge reimposed the same sentence without rearticulating his reasons. On the second appeal, 66 the Seventh Circuit
thus was faced with a difficult situation: the sentence was too severe;
but since the trial judge had stated no reasons for its reimposition, the
sentence was immune from "procedural" scrutiny under Townsend.
Like the Third Circuit in a later case, 67 the Seventh Circuit could
have dealt with the absence of a reviewable record by simply presuming that the sentencing judge had considered tainted factors. But
the Wiley II court, unwilling so to speculate, exercised its supervisory
power and straightforwardly engaged in substantive review of the sentence itself, setting it aside and remanding with directions for a reduced sentence.
Reviewing abuse of discretion. The most direct assault on the
rule against sentence review has been mounted by several courts propounding the novel view that even a sentence within statutory limits
may constitute an abuse of discretion.
The traditional view of the sentencing judge's unbridled discretion is exemplified by the case of Peterson v. United States.6s Upon
sentencing Peterson to three years' imprisonment for the crime of stealing a postage stamp, the trial judge stated his belief that the defendant
was also guilty of subornation of perjury, an offense for which he had
not been indicted. Noting that the sentence seemed "oversevere,"
the Fourth Circuit nevertheless adopted the Freeman9 court's description of the breadth of a sentencing judge's discretion:
The question of the nature of the sentence was one which rested in
64. For a discussion of the fifth amendment implications of Thomas, see notes
35-36 supra and accompanying text.
65. For a discussion of Wiley 1, see text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
66. United States v. Wiley [Ii], 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
See text accom67. Virgin Islands v. Turner, 409 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1969).
panying notes 31-33 supra.
68. 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917). For a long-range history of the growth of
sentencing-judge discretion, see Pugh & Carver, Due Process and Sentencing: From
Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEx. L. REv. 25, 26-27 (1970).
69. Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
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the discretion of the court below, a discretion which will not be reviewed in this court in any case where the punishment assessed is
within the statutory limits. 7°

The continuing strength of this principle is illustrated by the fact
that the Wiley II court was unable to find that the trial judge had "abused

his discretion" in reimposing a heavy sentence, even when contrary to
clear appellate suggestion that the sentence was unfair.71
Leach v. United States7 2 presented similar circumstances but a
different conclusion. There, the lower court disregarded the appel-

late court's suggestion 73 that it order a presentence mental examination of the defendant.

Though the sentence imposed did not exceed

the statutory limit, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the sentencing judge's refusal to follow the appellate "suggestion" constituted
an abuse of discretion.7 4
Two recent cases in the Sixth and Eighth Circuits-UnitedStates
v. McKinney 5 and Woosley v. United States 7l--represent the
greatest incursions yet into the area of the sentencing judge's discretion. Both courts confronted essentially the same fact situations. The
defendants, of good record and reputation, refused to obey induction
orders and were convicted of violating the Selective Service laws. The
trial judges, following the well established policies of their respective
districts, automatically imposed the maximum five-year sentence. Exercising what they thought to be complete discretion, the trial judges
in effect held that the harmful consequences of Selective Service violations predominated over the rehabilitation of draft resisters. 7
In McKinney, the Sixth Circuit held that the habitual imposi78
tion of a maximum sentence constituted "a gross abuse of discretion.
70. 246 F. at 119. Accord, e.g., United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); United States v. Restaino, 405 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969); United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1950). But see United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (4th Cir. 1973)
(concurring opinion).
71. 278 F.2d at 502.
72. 334 F.2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1964), noted in 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964).
73. Leach v. United States, 320 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
74. 334 F.2d at 948.
75. 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972), noted in 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1128 (1973).
76. 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973).
77. See Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (6th Cir. 1972). One judge's reason for
always imposing the maximum sentence is quoted in United States v. Charles, 460 F.2d
1093, 1095 (6th Cir. 1972): "[W]hen you consider a man has just willfully .. .
refused to serve his country, it would seem to be a travesty that he would serve less
time at confinement. . . than a man who went on and served."
78. 466 F.2d at 1405.
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The court ruled that the sentencing judge's rigid procedure was contrary to a policy, approved by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New
York, 9 that a sentence should reflect the circumstances of individual
defendants as well as the best interest of the rest of society.80 The

appellate court thereupon reduced McKinney's sentence to one year.
The Woosley court agreed that this inflexible sentencing procedure was contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate.8" But the Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, further found an abuse of discretion in the
severity of the sentence itself.8 2 While basing its holding primarily
upon the character and circumstances of the offender, 3 the court
also noted the disparity between Woosley's five-year sentence and the

lighter sentences usually imposed in other jurisdictions on violators of
the draft laws.8 4 In addition, the court focused on the sentencing
judge's failure to explain his reasons for the severe sentence. 88 The
Eighth Circuit's willingness to probe into all aspects of Woosley's
sentence-procedural and substantive-well illustrates the decline of
the rule against sentence review.
Prospectsfor the Rule

The most likely source of sweeping change of the rule against
review is legislation.86 In 1967 the Senate passed a bill providing that
79. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Holding that sentencing judges are free from evidentiary restrictions on the material they may consider, the Court approved, but did not
mandate, "individualizing punishment." Id. at 247-49. See also Williams v. Oklahoma,
358 U.S. 576, 585-86 (1959).
80. 466 F.2d at 1404-05.
81. Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973): "We believe
that we have the power to examine and review a sentence if it is shown to have been
imposed on a mechanical basis."
Uniform sentencing of draft resisters has also troubled the Second Circuit. In a
recent case, that court unanimously expressed its opposition to any fixed sentencing
policy for Selective Service violators. However, the majority ruled that the trial judge
in the case under consideration had not abused his discretion. See United States v.
Baker, No. 73-1598 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 1973), reported in 170 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1973,
at 1, col. 3.
82. 478 F.2d at 146-48. Compare United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 624
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969), where the appeals court was unable to
find an abuse of discretion though it explicitly disapproved the maximum five-year
sentence imposed for a Selective Service violation.
83. 478 F.2d at 147-48.
84. Id. at 147. The court took judicial notice of data indicating, for instance, that
in 1971 most convicted draft resisters received probation and only 2.8 percent received
the maximum sentence. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958), where Justice Frankfurter
noted that "the much mooted problems relating to the power of the judiciary to review
sentences" are "peculiarly questions of legislative policy."
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"the court of appeals may affirm, reduce, modify, vacate, or set aside
the sentence imposed .
The House failed to act on the bill,
and the proposal has not since become law. s8 However, in 1970 both
houses of Congress approved appellate review where a defendant was
sentenced as a "dangerous special offender" under the Organized Crime
Control Act:8 9 "The court of appeals . ..may .. .impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing court could
originally have imposed .... ",10
Since the rule against sentence review was developed by appellate court judges, theoretically any circuit could rescind the rule by
a reinterpretation of the statutory grant of appellate power to "modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree or order ....
Indeed, it appears that the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have rescinded the
rule in their novel holdings that a trial judge can abuse his discretion in
imposing a sentence within statutory limits. It may be that other circuits will follow suit when confronted with excessive sentences that are
unassailable on procedural grounds. 92 The Supreme Court, of course,
could lay down the much-needed uniform rule of sentence review,
but in recent years it has avoided the problem.9"
The enumerated exceptions have, however, greatly weakened the
general rule that a sentencing judge's decision as to the proper severity of
punishment for a crime is unreviewable. Due to the breadth of these
exceptions and the increased appellate willingness to reduce oversevere
sentences, a trial judge can completely avoid sentence review only by
keeping secret the grounds of his decision.
*."..,

A

REVIEWABLE

RECORD

In order to ensure a more uniform application of the exceptions
to the rule of nonreview, an appellate court should have two kinds of
information about the district judge's sentencing decision. First, the
reviewing court should know what material the sentencing judge con87. S.1540, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3742(c) (1967).
88. An identical bill is again pending before the Senate as this Note goes to press.
S.716, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
89. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575 et seq. (1970). For the detailed statutory definition of
"dangerous special offender," see id. § 3575(e) (1)-(3).
90. Id. § 3576.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
92. See 170 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 8, 1973, at 1, col. 3 (discussion of United States v. Baker,
No. 73-1598 (2d Cir. 1973) ).
93. See, e.g., Weston v. United States, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972), denying cert. to
448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971); Gollaher v. United States, 396 U.S. 960, denying cert. to
419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1969).
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sidered with regard to the defendant's prior criminal record and to his
prospects for rehabilitation. That information is normally found in a
presentence report. Second, the appeals court should be made aware
of the trial judge's reasons for imposing a particular sentence. At
present, inquiry into the decision-making process for sentencing has
been all but foreclosed, since disclosure of the presentence report and
of the reasons for the sentence is subject to the discretion of the
trial judge. For effective review, a sentencing judge must be required
to "leave a trail" by which his decision can be reviewed.
Disclosureof the PresentenceReport
Under rule 32(c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the presentence report, compiled "unless the court otherwise
directs,"' 4 is disclosed to the defendant and thus becomes a part of the
record at the discretion of the trialjudge:95
The report . . . shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant
and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition
and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence. . . . The court before imposing sentence may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained
in the report . . . and afford an opportunity to the defendant or his
counsel to comment thereon. 9 6
Within most circuits, this discretion is not routinely exercised.9 7 One
survey published in the mid-1960's asked district judges whether it was
their "practice" to "divulge any information contained in presentence
reports to defense counsel." Almost sixty percent of the responding
judges indicated that indeed it was not their practice to divulge such
information.9
Moreover, these discretionary decisions to withhold
94.

FED. R. CGIM. P. 32(c)(1).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1970).
96. FED. R. CGum. P. 32(c) (2) (emphasis added).
97. But see United States v. Powell, No. 73-1210 (4th Cir. Nov. 14, 1973)
(report should be withheld only where there are "sound reasons for preserving
secrecy"); United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972) (requiring disclosure of all material in the report which was actually relied upon, with a disclaimer of
reliance upon undisclosed information); United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.
1972) (requiring disclosure of all rule 32(c) (2) material in order to guard against
clerical error); Buchea v. Sullivan, 262 Ore. 222, 497 P.2d 1169 (1972) (requiring
complete disclosure).
98. Higgins, Confidentiality of Presentence Reports, 28 ALBANY L. REv. 12, 15
(1964). One hundred forty-six federal district judges responded to this particular
question.
In one exceptional case, a court of appeals has decreed minimal standards for disclosure: "The sentencing court should apprise [the defendant] . . . of at least such
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the presentence report have been consistently upheld on appeal.0 0

The three arguments generally advanced to support nondisclosure °" are (1) that disclosure would result in reports of poor quality
as previously confidential sources dried up, (2) that disclosure would

delay the sentencing process, and (3) that the probation officers who
compile reports should be trusted to use only accurate information.
These arguments have been copiously rebutted. 1 1 The experience
of three jurisdictions with a practice of disclosure has indicated that

sources do not dry up. 102 As for delay, of 167 federal district judges responding to the above poll,
not one judge with a practice of disclosure complained that the sentencing process had become unduly protracted. . . . Several judges noted
. .. that disclosure permits . . . the discussion to be directed to perti03
nent considerations.
Finally, though probation officers are generally trustworthy, mistakes in the presentence report are common 0 4 because probation officers often shoulder extremely heavy work loads.'0
In short, the
pivotal matters of public record as the convictions and .harges of crime, with date and
place, attributed to him in the report." Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931, 933
(4th Cir. 1968). Presumably it is not the practice of most of the judges responding
to the Higgins poll even to disclose such matters.
99. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDunR
§ 524 n.60 (1969) (citing cases). But see United States v. Bryant, 442 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 932 (1971) (district judge's refusal to disclose held an abuse of discretion
on the particular facts of the case).
100. See, e.g., Parsons, The Presentence Investigation Report Must Be Preserved as
a ConfidentialDocument, 28 FED. PROBATON 3, 4-5, 7 (1964); Roche, The Position for
Confidentiality of the Presentence Investigation Report, 29 ALBAN'
L, REv. 206
(1965).
101. See, e.g., Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports, 47 F.R.D.
225, 238-40 (1969). See also Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility,
65 HARv.L. REv. 1281, 1291-92 (1952).
102. See Bach, The Defendant's Right of Access to Presentence Reports, 4 C0mM.
L BULL. 160, 164 (1968) (California); Lorensen, The Disclosure to Defense of Presentence Reports in West Virginia, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 159, 163-64 (1967) (West Virginia); Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 126-27 (1963)
(Maryland federal district courts).
103. Higgins, supra note 98, at 32.
104. One presentence investigator mistakenly reported that the defendant had spent
most of his life in jail and had escaped from a California jail. No doubt as a result,
the defendant was sentenced to twenty-one years for check forgery. See Lehrich,
supra note 101, at 241-44 (citing further examples). For a description of typical
weaknesses (besides falsehood) of presentence reports, see Bennings v. United States,
343 F.2d 283, 285 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bazelon, CJ., dissenting).
105. "[Dluring 1963 522 federal probation officers completed 26,226 presentence
investigations, 6,860 prerelease investigations for the Board of Parole, and supervised
nearly 39,000 defendants on probation." Lehrich, supra note 101, at 241.
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reasons for relying upon the district judge's discretion as to disclosure of the presentence report do not appear persuasive:
It seems an unusual kind of discretion to give, for it is difficult for the
court to exercise it in an intelligent fashion. The reason for disclosure
is the fear that the report may be incomplete or inaccurate, and yet
these flaws will hardly appear on the face of the document.' 06
In addition to policy considerations, it has been argued that due process
requires disclosure of the presentence report.' 0 7 Similarly, since defendants are accorded a right of confrontation at trial, it seems no
less desirable that there be some such right at the equally crucial sentencing stage.108 Review of a severe sentence is too important to depend partly, as it does now, on fortuitous disclosure of the presentence report.
The arguments for nondisclosure of the presentence report are
not only unconvincing, but they have been made without reference to
the increased availability of sentence review. In Townsend v. Burke,
review was justified because the defendant was sentenced on the basis
of assumptions concerning his criminal record which were found to be
materially untrue.' 0 9 In United States v. Weston, unreliable information in the presentence report prompted review." 0 If appeals courts,
independent of the district judge, are willing to assess the proper weight
to be given items in the report, then minimal fairness to the defendant
mandates disclosure of the report. As stated by Judge Browning in his
separate opinion in Verdugo v. United States:"' "It would seem anomalous to hold that although a sentence based upon erroneous information which counsel could correct violates due process, counsel need not
be given access to that information."" 2
Changes in the rule of discretionary disclosure are unlikely to
come from the Supreme Court, which has denied certiorari in cases go106. 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 99, § 524.
107. See Pugh & Carver, supra note 68, at 37-39.
108. Approximately seventy percent of federal defendants plead guilty. See JUDICIAL
CONFRENPCE OF T=m UNITED STATEs, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF TuE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE Op THE UNITED STATES CouRTs 261 (1968). For those defendants, the
few procedural protections afforded at sentencing are particularly significant, inasmuch as the guilty plea negates the protection offered by safeguards that apply only
during trial.

109. 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
110. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 25-29. In
Weston the sentencing judge did disclose certain portions of the presentence report
at trial.
111. 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, I., separate opinion), cert. denied,
402 U.S.961 (1971).
112. Id.at 613.
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ing both ways on the question of whether a district judge abused his
discretion in refusing to disclose the presentence report.11 However,
in 1970 the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules recommended
that disclosure be mandatory in the absence of an explained finding
by the district judge that harm "to the defendant or to other persons"
would result from disclosure. In the event of such a finding, under
the proposed revision of rule 32, the district judge must disclose a
"summary of the factual information contained [in the report] to be
relied on in determining sentence."' 14 Acceptance of the Advisory
Committee's proposal would be a major step toward effective review;
and it would go far to ensure that sentences are not based upon false,
unreliable, or materially incomplete information.
Statement of Reasonsfor a Sentence
Like the presentence report, the reasons for the imposition of a
particular sentence are generally mired in the vagaries of judicial discretion. At present, district judges must justify the sentences they
impose in only two general situations." 35 In North Carolina v.
Pearce,' the Supreme Court held that where a defendant's sentence is increased after a new trial, the judge's reasons for the increase
"must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy
of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.""17 Secondly, under Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the
"reasons for the sentence imposed" must be stated where a district
8
court sentences a defendant as a "dangerous special offender.""1
113. See Bryant v. United States, 402 U.S. 932, denying cert. to 442 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Bakewell v.United States, 400 U.S. 964, denying cert. to 430 F.2d 721
(5th Cir. 1970).
114. Proposed FaD. R. Camm. P. 32.2(c) (2), reprinted in 48 F.R.D. 553, 615
(1970).
115. Circuit courts of appeals have occasionally demanded statements of reasons for
sentences in certain other isolated contexts. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 462
F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Latimer, 415 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1969).
116. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
117. Id. at 726. The trial judge's reasons for an increased sentence "must be
based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding," id., so as to
avoid penalizing defendant's exercise of his right to appeal.
Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, whenever plea-bargaining has broken down and the
judge imposes a heavier sentence than one previously discussed, "the record must affirmatively show that the court sentenced the defendant solely upon the facts of his
case and his personal history, and not as punishment for his refusal to plead guilty."
United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948
(1973).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970). The district court must also identify " the information relied upon." See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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Two major arguments have been advanced in support of the general rule that district judges need not justify their sentences. One is
that sentencing is not amenable to structured decision-making: "Frequently, the decision will rest on the application of unarticulated
principles and factors lying at the threshold of the conscious." 9 Presumably, those "unarticulated principles" have to do with the ultimate goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment. Although
it has been argued that trial and appellate courts should more closely
analyze sentences as possible means of attaining those goals,120 it
should be noted that certain less cosmic "reasons" for severe sentences have been designated as improper. For example, the fact that
the defendant stood trial' 2 ' or refused to admit his guilt 22 should in
most jurisdictions be irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Such reasons now become part of the record only if the sentencing judge is
unusually frank or if he blunders. To say that recorded reasons will
not necessarily be honest 123 overlooks the potentially benign, standardizing effect of appellate instruction as to proper reasoning in sen24
tencing.1
The other principal argument for the present system is that the recording of sentence justification would place a useless burden on the
district judge's time. But the importance of reasoned sentencing clearly
warrants the burden. According to District Judge Frankel:
The duty to give an account of the decision is to promote thought by
the decider, to compel him to cover the relevant points, to help him to
eschew irrelevancies-and, finally, to make him show that these necessities have been served ...
Knowing this to be so, we apply it to affairs of clearly less consequence, yet we place no burden of explanation upon the judge who decides that the defendant before him must be locked up for ten years
25
rather than five or one.'
119. United States v. Schipani, 315 F. Supp. 253, 259 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). Compare Wyzanski, supra note
101, at 1292-93:
Our judgment, they say, is better than our reasons .... [B]ut there is grave
danger that a sentencing judge will allow his emotion or other transient factors
to sway him.... Moreover, the explicit utterance of relevant criteria serves
as a guide for future dispositions both by him and other judges.
120. See M. FRNKEL,supra note 3, at viii.
121. See United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
122. See Thomas v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
123. See Weigel, supra note 48, at 421: "Plausible rationalizations can often be
adduced to support excessive sentences ...."
124. See K. DAvis, DISCREnONARY JusIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133 (1969):
"All the elements of structuring are needed [in sentencing]-open plans, policy statements and rules, findings and reasons, and open precedents."
125. M. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 41.
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It may be that legislation will soon mandate a reviewable record.
Passed by the Senate in 1967 and again pending, the same bill which
provides for appellate review of sentences also stipulates: "In each
felony case in which sentence of imprisonment or death is imposed the
judge shall state for the record his reasons for selecting that particular
sentence.'126 The bill recognizes, as should the courts, that without
a reviewable record, expanded review of sentences cannot change the
current situation in which excessive and disparate sentences are com1 27
mon.
CONCLUSION

Many of the cases discussed in this Note stand for the proposition
that sentencing-judge discretion, while useful for tailoring sentences
to individual defendants, should not be unlimited. Appeals courts are
now reviewing matters that were previously thought to be within the
sentencing judge's sole discretion. However, for practical purposes,
sentence review depends on a record which indicates the grounds of
the sentence. If defendants are held entitled to review of improper
sentences, as they increasingly are, that entitlement is too important
to be frustrated by a trial judge's unwarranted belief that the sentencing process is best kept secret.
126. S.716, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., § 3742(e) (1973); S.1540, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.,
§ 3742(e) (1967).
127. For a brief indication of the excessiveness and disparity of some sentences, see
notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text.

